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Page 1
Symmetric Decomposition of Asymmetric Games.
Tuyls K, Pérolat J, Lanctot M, Ostrovski G, Savani R, Leibo JZ, Ord T, Graepel T, Legg S. Tuyls K, et al. Sci Rep. 2018 Jan 17;8(1):1015. doi: 10.1038/s41598-018-19194-4. Sci Rep. 2018. PMID: 29343692 Free PMC article.
Specifically, we show how an asymmetric bimatrix game (A,B) can be decomposed into its symmetric counterparts by envisioning and investigating the payoff tables (A and B) that constitute the asymmetric game, as two independent, single population, symmetric …
Specifically, we show how an asymmetric bimatrix game (A,B) can be decomposed into its symmetric counterparts by envisioning a …
Symmetric replicator dynamics with depletable resources.
Mitchener WG. Mitchener WG. Chaos. 2022 Apr;32(4):043121. doi: 10.1063/5.0081182. Chaos. 2022. PMID: 35489865
The replicator equation is a standard model of evolutionary population game dynamics. In this article, we consider a modification of replicator dynamics, in which playing a particular strategy depletes an associated resource, and the payoff for that strategy is a function …
The replicator equation is a standard model of evolutionary population game dynamics. In this article, we consider a modification of …
A two-player iterated survival game.
Wakeley J, Nowak M. Wakeley J, et al. Theor Popul Biol. 2019 Feb;125:38-55. doi: 10.1016/j.tpb.2018.12.001. Epub 2018 Dec 12. Theor Popul Biol. 2019. PMID: 30552911
We describe an iterated game between two players, in which the payoff is to survive a number of steps. ...We consider individuals with hardwired, unconditional behaviors or strategies. When both players are present, each step is a symmetric two-player game. T …
We describe an iterated game between two players, in which the payoff is to survive a number of steps. ...We consider individuals wit …
The asymmetric Hawk-Dove game with costs measured as time lost.
Křivan V, Cressman R. Křivan V, et al. J Theor Biol. 2022 Aug 21;547:111162. doi: 10.1016/j.jtbi.2022.111162. Epub 2022 May 14. J Theor Biol. 2022. PMID: 35577103 Free article.
The classic Hawk-Dove game is a symmetric game in that it does not distinguish between the winners and losers of Hawk-Hawk or Dove-Dove contests. ...These recovery times depend on whether the Hawk won or lost the contest so that we consider an asymmetric Hawk …
The classic Hawk-Dove game is a symmetric game in that it does not distinguish between the winners and losers of Hawk-H …
Game dynamics of emotion evolution based on the Moran process.
Dai YY, Zhan GJ, Ye Y, Bao W, Wen T, Cheong KH, Xie NG. Dai YY, et al. Chaos. 2021 Mar;31(3):033153. doi: 10.1063/5.0033680. Chaos. 2021. PMID: 33810732
The corresponding relationship between the four emotion types and the two behaviors of competition and cooperation is then defined. The payoff matrices of the game based on emotions are obtained and the evolutionary dynamics of the four emotion types in a finite population …
The corresponding relationship between the four emotion types and the two behaviors of competition and cooperation is then defined. The payo …
Learning with repeated-game strategies.
Ioannou CA, Romero J. Ioannou CA, et al. Front Neurosci. 2014 Jul 30;8:212. doi: 10.3389/fnins.2014.00212. eCollection 2014. Front Neurosci. 2014. PMID: 25126053 Free PMC article.
We use the self-tuning Experience Weighted Attraction model with repeated-game strategies as a computer testbed to examine the relative frequency, speed of convergence and progression of a set of repeated-game strategies in four symmetric 2 2 games: Prisoner' …
We use the self-tuning Experience Weighted Attraction model with repeated-game strategies as a computer testbed to examine the relati …
Optimal guessing in 'Guess Who'.
O'Neill B. O'Neill B. PLoS One. 2021 Mar 10;16(3):e0247361. doi: 10.1371/journal.pone.0247361. eCollection 2021. PLoS One. 2021. PMID: 33690608 Free PMC article.
Are you Anne? We look at the strategic problem in the children's guessing game Guess Who, which is a form of zero-sum symmetric game with perfect information. ...While the paper is based on the popular children's game, our analysis generalises the actu …
Are you Anne? We look at the strategic problem in the children's guessing game Guess Who, which is a form of zero-sum symmetric …
Pairwise interact-and-imitate dynamics.
Bilancini E, Boncinelli L, Campigotto N. Bilancini E, et al. Sci Rep. 2021 Jun 24;11(1):13221. doi: 10.1038/s41598-021-92512-5. Sci Rep. 2021. PMID: 34168182 Free PMC article.
This paper introduces and studies a class of evolutionary dynamics-pairwise interact-and-imitate dynamics (PIID)-in which agents are matched in pairs, engage in a symmetric game, and imitate the opponent with a probability that depends on the difference in their pay …
This paper introduces and studies a class of evolutionary dynamics-pairwise interact-and-imitate dynamics (PIID)-in which agents are matched …
Asymmetric public goods game cooperation through pest control.
Reeves T, Ohtsuki H, Fukui S. Reeves T, et al. J Theor Biol. 2017 Dec 21;435:238-247. doi: 10.1016/j.jtbi.2017.09.006. Epub 2017 Sep 20. J Theor Biol. 2017. PMID: 28939346 Free article.
Here we study a game theoretic model of cooperation for pest control among farmers. ...Moreover, an increase in the number of farmers can sometimes paradoxically undermine pest prevention. A comparison with a symmetric public goods game model reveals that the …
Here we study a game theoretic model of cooperation for pest control among farmers. ...Moreover, an increase in the number of farmers …
Asymmetric Evolutionary Games.
McAvoy A, Hauert C. McAvoy A, et al. PLoS Comput Biol. 2015 Aug 26;11(8):e1004349. doi: 10.1371/journal.pcbi.1004349. eCollection 2015 Aug. PLoS Comput Biol. 2015. PMID: 26308326 Free PMC article.
Evolutionary game theory is a powerful framework for studying evolution in populations of interacting individuals. A common assumption in evolutionary game theory is that interactions are symmetric, which means that the players are distinguished by only their …
Evolutionary game theory is a powerful framework for studying evolution in populations of interacting individuals. A common assumptio …
224 results